Through the Wormhole: Tracking Invisible MPLS Tunnels by Vanaubel, Yves et al.
Through the Wormhole: Tracking Invisible MPLS Tunnels
Yves Vanaubel∗, Pascal Mérindol‡, Jean-Jacques Pansiot‡, Benoit Donnet∗
∗Monteﬁore Institute, Université de Liège – Belgium
‡ Icube, Université de Strasbourg – France
ABSTRACT
For years, Internet topology research has been conducted through
activemeasurement. For instance,Caida builds router level topolo-
gies on top of IP level traces obtained with traceroute. The result-
ing graphs contain a signiﬁcant amount of nodes with a very large
degree, often exceeding the actual number of interfaces of a router.
Although this property may result from inaccurate alias resolution,
we believe that opaque MPLS clouds made of invisible tunnels are
the main cause. Using Layer-2 technologies such as MPLS, routers
can be conﬁgured to hide internal IP hops from traceroute. Con-
sequently, an entry point of anMPLS network appears as the neigh-
bor of all exit points and the whole Layer-3 network turns into a
dense mesh of high degree nodes.
This paper tackles three problems: the revelation of IP hops hid-
den by MPLS tunnels, the MPLS deployment underestimation, and
the overestimation of high degree nodes. We develop new mea-
surement techniques able to reveal the presence and content of
invisible MPLS tunnels. We assess them through emulation and
cross-validation and perform a large-scale measurement campaign
targeting suspicious networks on which we apply statistical analy-
sis. Finally, based on our dataset, we look at basic graph properties
impacted by invisible tunnels.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the nineties, the Internet topology discovery
has been extensively investigated. Indeed, numerous analyses [18,
26] have been proposed to describe various types of connectivity
structures and representations of the Internet architecture. In par-
ticular, inferring the router level topology of IP networks is an im-
portant concern, notably to study routing characteristics. These
router level maps are obtained by grouping together IP addresses
collected with traceroute: this process is called alias resolution.
Inferring the architecture of an Autonomous System (AS) is also
crucial for analyzing the performance of routing protocols. Using
random graph models rather than realistic networking topologies
may result in biased or even wrong conclusions. For example, the
performance of fast-rerouting schemes or multipath transport pro-
tocols strongly depend on the underlying topology.
Typically, router level topologies are undirected graphs built
upon IP level traces obtained from traceroute; then, they can be
statistically analyzed [33]. In particular, the node degree distribu-
tion fascinates the research community, specially since the Falout-
sos et al. [21] seminal paper highlighting the power-law shape of
this distribution. However, one may observe a signiﬁcant amount
of nodes with a very large degree, often exceeding the actual num-
ber of interfaces of a router. For instance, Fig. 1 illustrates the de-
gree distribution of nodes in the Caida ITDK dataset [10] where
we observe a large amount of nodes having a very large degree.
This large amount of high degree nodes might be explained by
several factors. A traceroute campaign conducted from a lim-
ited number of vantage points can tend to induce a subgraph in
which the inferred node degree distribution does follow a power
law even if this is not the actual distribution [28]. Clauset and
Moore [16] have since demonstrated analytically that such a phe-
nomenon is to be expected for the speciﬁc case of the Erdös-Rényi
random graphs [20]. Second, others [31] have stated that high de-
gree nodes can emerge from Layer-2 (L2) clouds (such as Ethernet
switches). L2 devices interconnect a large number of Layer-3 (L3)
routers, themselves being also involved in multiple L2 interconnec-
tions. Such a situation induces nodes with very high degrees when
analyzing the L3 graph with traceroute probing.
In this paper, we investigate another reason for HDNs in the In-
ternet graph: opaque MPLS clouds hiding their content to trace-
route probing [19]. MultiProtocol Label Switching (MPLS) [35] is
a technology that has been designed to speedup forwarding deci-
sions (through exact labelmatching instead of longest preﬁxmatch-
ing on IP addresses) but is nowadays mainly deployed for provid-
ing IGP/BGP scalability, virtual private network (VPN) services [32],
and traﬃc engineering capability [37, 41]. It has been shown that
MPLS is largely deployed by operators [19, 36, 38, 39] thanks to
dedicated measures making use of MPLS transparency features:





























Figure 1: Node degree distribution in Caida ITDK dataset.
(i) the ability of MPLS routers to generate ICMP time-exceeded
packets with MPLS label information [9] and, (ii), the ability of
the TTL to be decremented (and thus making probing packets ex-
piring) within the MPLS tunnel [1]. This MPLS popularity is also
conﬁrmed by a survey we made between August 28th, 2017 and
September 12th, 2017. In the data collected (50 answers, from Stub
ISPs to Tier-1) through direct contacts with operators or the Nanog
community, it shows up that 87% of the surveyed operators deploy
MPLS. It has also been demonstrated that MPLS tunnels may have
an impact on Internet topology discovery tools [2, 6, 22].
Unfortunately, ISPs may want to hide, or, at least, not provide in
details the structure and the conﬁguration of their internal MPLS
networks. For VPN services, provider networks generally prefer to
simplify the routing view of their customers: they just see provider
equipment directly connecting their diﬀerent customer sites in-
stead of viewing all the provider internal architecture details. To
achieve this, theymay restrict the deployment ofMPLS transparen-
cy features, leading so to invisible MPLS tunnels [19] (i.e., the con-
tent of the tunnel is hidden to traceroute probes). Doing so, they
can avoid competitor networks to imitate their ﬁnely tuned cali-
bration and also avoid attackers to get knowledge of their internal
organization [24].
Consequently, the data obtained by researchers from traceroute
measurements is incomplete and the resulting Internet maps are
potentially biased. Indeed, as the content of the tunnel is hidden,
a direct, but false, link between the entry and exit points of the
tunnel is inferred. Further, an entry point of a MPLS network ap-
pears as the direct neighbor of all exit points. The whole L3 net-
work turns, then, into a dense mesh of high degree nodes [42].
It means that (i) current basic traceroute campaigns cause false
router-level links to be inferred (between two edge routers sepa-
rated by an invisible tunnel), that (ii) MPLS deployment in the In-
ternet may be underestimated (missing internal IP links), and that
(iii) node degree distribution, and other graph properties such as
density or clustering coeﬃcient, may be shifted to higher values.
Another reason for identifying invisible MPLS tunnel is to better
capture network delay anomalies [23]. Indeed, as the content of
the tunnel is hidden to traceroute, the delay between the entry
and exit point of the tunnel might appear as being artiﬁcially high,
possibly leading to wrong conclusion when tracking connectivity
issues.
In this paper, our aim is to ﬁx those issues by proposing new
probing mechanisms and analyses when exploiting IP level traces.
In particular, our contributions are threefold. First, we develop and
validate new activemeasurement techniques based on traceroute
and TTL estimation that are able to, at worst (and as long as the
UHP feature1 is not enabled), reveal the presence of invisible tun-
nels and to, at best, expose their content in standard conﬁguration
cases. All proposed techniques have been assessed through emu-
lation testbeds with GNS3, an emulator running actual IOS in a
virtualized router2 and through cross-validation. In particular, we
show that our algorithms are eﬃcient in roughly 86% of the cases.
Second, with our speciﬁc dataset collected with our measurement
mechanisms and its analysis, we are therefore able to improve the
MPLS knowledge of the research community and provide an in-
sight on ISPs standard and common practices. Finally, and as an
illustration of our contribution purpose, we show how to improve
classical Internet topologymodels by correcting the biases in terms
of node degree, route length distributions, and graph density. Our
dataset and GNS3 conﬁguration scripts are freely available.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 pro-
vides the required background for this paper. Sec. 3 is the heart of
the paper as it presents and validates our measurement techniques
to reveal the content of invisible MPLS tunnels. Sec. 4 explains
how we deploy our measurement techniques in the wild, while
Sec. 5 presents the results. Sec. 6 discusses, based on the data we
collected, the ISPs standard practices in deploying MPLS tunnels.
Sec. 7 reviews a few basic Internet modeling features based on re-
vealed invisible MPLS tunnels. Finally, Sec. 8 concludes this paper
by summarizing its main achievements.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 MPLS
MPLS routers, i.e., Label Switching Routers (LSRs), exchange la-
beled packets over Label Switched Paths (LSPs). In practice, those
packets are tagged with one or more label stack entries (LSE) in-
serted between the frame header (data-link layer) and the IP packet
(network layer). Each LSE is made of four ﬁelds: an MPLS label
used for forwarding the packet to the next router, a Traﬃc Class
ﬁeld for quality of service, priority, and Explicit Congestion Noti-
ﬁcation [3], a bottom of stack ﬂag bit (to indicate whether the cur-
rent LSE is the last in the stack [34]), and a time-to-live (LSE-TTL)
ﬁeld having the same purpose as the IP-TTL ﬁeld [1] (i.e., avoiding
routing loops).
The ﬁrst MPLS router (the Ingress Label Edge Router, or Ingress
LER, i.e., the tunnel entry point) adds the label stack, while the
last MPLS router (Egress Label Edge Router, or Egress LER, i.e., the
tunnel exit point) removes the label stack (Ultimate Hop Popping,
UHP, where the Egress LER advertises an explicit null label – label
value of 0 [34]). In practice, and in most cases (at least this is the
default conﬁguration), the top LSE is removed by the penultimate
LSR, that we call the Last Hop (LH). This operation is called Penul-
timate Hop Popping (PHP) and is activated by the Egress LER when
it advertises an implicit null label (label value of 3 [34]). Since the
top LSE has been removed by the Last Hop, the Egress LER per-
forms then only a classic IP lookup to forward the traﬃc. It allows
1See Sec.2 for MPLS technical details about Penultimate Hop Popping (PHP) and Ul-
timate Hop Popping (UHP).
2See https://gns3.com/
3See http://www.monteﬁore.ulg.ac.be/~bdonnet/mpls
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Figure 2: GNS3 topology. AS2 is a transit AS with MPLS enabled (labels distributed with LDP). PE1 acts as Ingress LER, PE2 as
Egress LER, and Pi are LSRs. CE2 is the traceroute destination. Notation Pi.left refers to left interface of router Pi (the same
applies for CEj and PEk ). PHP is applied by P3.
thus to reduce the load on the Egress LER, especially if it is the
root of a large LSP-tree. This means that, when using PHP, the
last MPLS operation (i.e., popping) is performed one hop before
the Egress LER, on the Last Hop. On the contrary, UHP is gener-
ally used only when the operator implements sophisticated traﬃc
engineering operations. This is conﬁrmed by our survey as UHP
is only deployed by 10% of the operators. Fig. 2 illustrates, among
others, the main vocabulary associated to MPLS tunnels.
Labels may be allocated through the Label Distribution Protocol
(LDP) [4]. Each LSR announces to its neighbors the association be-
tween a preﬁx in its routing table and a label it has chosen. There-
fore, labels are allocated from downstream and, for a given preﬁx, a
router advertises the same label to all its neighbors. Depending on
the implementation, LDPmay advertise a label for all preﬁxes in its
IGP routing table (default case for Cisco routers [17, Chap. 4], [8])
or only for loopback addresses (default case for Juniper routers [8]).
LDP is mainly used for scalability reasons (e.g., to limit BGP-IGP in-
teractions to edge routers) as deployed tunnels are congruent with
the IGP. Labels can also be distributed through RSVP-TE [7], when
MPLS is used for Traﬃc Engineering (TE) purposes. In practice,
most operators consider the use of RSVP-TE in addition to the use
of LDP. This is conﬁrmed by our survey. While LDP-only is used
by 50% of the operators, RSVP-TE is used alone by only 8% of the
operators. RSVP-TE and LDP are used in conjunction by 42% of
the operators. Note that only a single operator considers another
labeling protocol.4
2.2 Measuring MPLS Tunnels
LSRs may send ICMP time-exceeded messages when the LSE-
TTL expires. If the LSR implements RFC 4950 [9] (as it should be
the case for all recent OSes), it simply quotes the MPLS LSE stack
of the received packet in the ICMP time-exceeded message.
If the Ingress LER copies the IP-TTL value to the LSE-TTL ﬁeld
rather than setting the LSE-TTL to an arbitrary value such as 255,
LSRs along the LSPwill reveal themselves via ICMPmessages, even
if they do not implement RFC4950 (in such a case they do not quote
the LSE but just reveal their incoming IP address). Operators can
conﬁgure this transparency operation using the ttl-propagate
option provided by the router manufacturer [1] (while, to the best
of our knowledge, RFC4950 compliance is just a matter of imple-
mentation, and cannot be deactivated on recent OSes supporting
4Probably for Segment Routing as LDP or RSVP-TE are not required to distribute
labels in this case [14, Chap. 1, pg. 2].
Router Signature Router Brand and OS
< 255, 255 > Cisco (IOS, IOS XR)
< 255, 64 > Juniper (Junos)
< 128, 128 > Juniper (JunosE)
< 64, 64 > Brocade, Alcatel, Linux
Table 1: Summary of main router signature, the ﬁrst initial
TTL of the pair corresponds to ICMP time-exceeded, while
the second is for ICMP echo-reply.
it). Donnet et al. [19] have discussed in detail the impact of those
two features (i.e., RFC4950 and ttl-propagate) on MPLS tunnel
discovery based on traceroute.
In this paper, we focus on invisible MPLS tunnels, i.e., tunnels
that are completely obscured from traceroute: the Ingress LER
does not enable the ttl-propagate option, and the last hop does
not send back an ICMP time-exceededmessage (that may embed
a MPLS LSE). Due to the PHP feature (with UHP the tunnel is even
more invisible than with PHP), the last hop is the LSR in charge of
converting theMPLS data packet into a standard IP one. It does not
send back neither a RFC4950 nor a standard ICMP error message,
because it does not decrement the IP-TTL. As a matter of fact, the
last hop considers now this transit packet as an IP one, and simply
pushes it to the Egress LER that will decrement the IP-TTL. Hence,
all IP hops inside the tunnel are hidden, and the topology informa-
tion is missing from traceroute exploration, providing so a biased
view of the network. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4d (for the
Paris traceroute [5] output) when performing a traceroute from
the Vantage Point towards the target, CE2 in AS3. In our survey,
a surprising large share of 48% of the operators make use of the
no-ttl-propagate option.
2.3 Network Fingerprinting
Vanaubel et al. [40] have presented a router ﬁngerprinting tech-
nique that classiﬁes networking devices based on their hardware
and OS. This method infers initial TTL values used by a router
when generating its diﬀerent kinds of reply packets. It then builds
the router signature, i.e., the n-tuple of n initial TTLs. A basic pair-
signature (with n = 2) simply uses the initial TTL of two diﬀerent
messages: an ICMP time-exceeded message elicited by a trace-
route probe, and an ICMP echo-replymessage obtained from an
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echo-request probe. Table 1 summarizes the main router signa-
tures, with associated router brands and router OSes. This feature
is really interesting since the two most deployed router brands,
Cisco and Juniper, have, in theory, distinct MPLS behaviors.
In our survey, if a large proportion (i.e., 25%) of operators used a
mix of router technologies, Cisco routers are the most prominent
(58%), followed by Juniper (28%).
3 DISCOVERING INVISIBLE MPLS TUNNELS
This section describes our techniques for revealing the content,
or at least identifying the presence, of invisible MPLS tunnels. We
propose four complementarymechanisms simply based on trace-
route or ping and falling into two categories. First, Forward/Re-
turn Path Length Analysis (FRPLA) and Return Tunnel Length Anal-
ysis (RTLA) are only able to provide more or less high-level in-
formation about invisible MPLS tunnels5: an estimation (FRPLA)
or the exact number (RTLA) of hops hidden by the return MPLS
tunnel6 between the Ingress and Egress LERs in the return LSP.
Second, Direct Path Revelation (DPR) and Backward Recursive Path
Revelation (BRPR) are able to explicitly reveal the content of the
obfuscated tunnel (the hidden LSR hops in the LSP), either in a
single probe or hop by hop with a recursive probing process.
Combining those four techniques allows us to capture a major-
ity of MPLS use cases: Juniper and Cisco standard behaviors and
typical network MPLS/IGP/BGP conﬁgurations (per default in par-
ticular). Table 2 summarizes the scope of the four measurement
techniques for diﬀerent MPLS conﬁgurations. While the two fol-
lowing sections deepens our measurement techniques (Sec. 3.1 is
dedicated to FRPLA and RTLA and Sec. 3.2 to DPR and BRPR),
Sec. 3.3 validates them using several studies: (i), experimentally
with GNS3, an emulator running the actual IOS of real routers in a
virtualized environment8, and (ii), with a dedicated cross-validation
campaign on explicit tunnels. Finally, Sec. 3.4 discusses the inher-
ent limitations of our techniques.
3.1 Inferring the Length of Tunnels
The two ﬁrst techniques (FRPLA and RTLA) are based on the
same principle. When entering an invisible tunnel in the forward
path (i.e., from source to destination), the IP-TTL is not copied in
theMPLS LSE (the Ingress LER does not enable the ttl-propagate
option, as explained in Sec. 2.2), making the tunnel appear to be a
single hop route. In Fig. 2, P1, P2, and P3 in AS2 are not revealed
by the traceroute run from the Vantage Point to the target CE2,
located in AS3. Instead, the link PE1 → PE2 appears as a single hop,
as illustrated by the ﬁrst Paris traceroute [5] output on Fig. 4c.
Hopefully, when performing the traceroute from the Vantage
Point to the target, when the TTL expires at the Egress LER, it gen-
erates an ICMP time-exceeded message. If this reply also goes
back to the Vantage Point through an MPLS tunnel, when leaving
this return tunnel at its last hop, the LSE-TTL is copied in the IP-
TTL only if it is lower than the IP-TTL in order to avoid routing
5Those methods are not able to reveal the internal IP hops hidden by the tunnels.
6A return tunnel refers to the MPLS tunnel taken by the ICMP time-exceeded or
ICMP echo-reply packet.
7On Juniper routers, the TTL of the ping reply diﬀers from the traceroute one [40].
We may exploit this singularity and analysis the potential gap between the two.
8See https://gns3.com/
loops (this min behavior is implemented by Cisco [17]). More for-
mally, if we denoteTTLI P (X ) (resp.,TTLLSE (X )) the IP-TTL (resp.,
LSE-TTL) of the reply in transit at a nodeX on the return path, and
h(X ,Y ) the number of hops (of the return path) from nodes X to-
wards Y , it comes:
TTLI P (VP) =min(TTLI P (E),TTLLSE (E)) − h(E,VP). (1)
whereVP is the vantage point that receives replies coming back via
E, the Egress LER of the return path.9 Thus, we have TTLI P (VP)
= TTLLSE (E) −h(E,VP)when there is a tunnel on the return path.
Indeed, it is very likely the LSE-TTL and the IP-TTL have been
initialized to the same value (e.g., 255 in the vast majority as de-
scribed in [40]) at the router that originates the ICMP reply, e.g., the
Egress LER of the forward path. Thus, the LSE-TTL, at E, is always
lower than the IP-TTL as it has been decremented along the return
LSP. While the forward tunnel is totally invisible, one can infer
the length of the return tunnel (LSETT L(E) is visible). For instance,
imagine on Fig. 2 that the forward tunnel from the Vantage Point
to CE2 is the same as the return tunnel when the IP packet expires
at PE2. In that case, when generating the ICMP time-exceeded,
PE2 sets the IP and LSE-TTL to 255 [40] but only the LSE-TTL is
decremented in the tunnel. When arriving at the Egress LER of the
return path (i.e., PE1), themin scheme is applied, resulting in the
value 252 being copied in the IP-TTL (i.e.,min(255, 252)). Thus, the
IP-TTL observed by the Vantage Point when receiving the ICMP
time-exceeded message would be 252 - 2 = 250.
In practice, this min scheme allows Egress routers to behave
the same (i.e., applying a minimum function on both TTLs before
leaving the MPLS tunnel) whether the ttl-propagate option is
used or not at the Ingress LER. Therefore, avoiding routing loop
occurrences is performed in a stateless manner without any sig-
nalization. With this standard behavior, the number of hops of the
tunnel is included in the return path length. However, the return
tunnel length is still not clearly retrievable. Indeed, the Egress of
the return path is not necessarily the Ingress of the forward path,
and the forward/return paths are not the same in general as rout-
ing, and BGP in particular, may introduce path asymmetry.
With FRPLA, we compare, at the AS granularity, the length dis-
tribution of forward and return paths. Then, we can statistically
analyze whether we observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerential (the so-called
“shift” in Table 2) as return paths are expected to be longer than for-
ward ones. Tunnel hops being not counted in the forward paths
while they are taken into account in the return paths. We expect
that, when no IP hops are hidden, the resulting distribution will
look like a normal distribution centered in 0 (i.e., forward and re-
turn paths have, on average, a similar length). If we observe, rather,
a shift towards positive values, it is then likely that the AS makes
use of the no-ttl-propagate option. This diﬀerence may provide
the average tunnel length of the AS.
As an example, on Fig. 2, the Egress LER, PE2, is located six hops
from the Vantage Point while only the two LERs (PE1 and PE2) are
exposed when the LSP is turned invisible. On the Paris traceroute
output, when the tunnel is made visible on Fig. 4a, we can observe
each internal hop of the forward LSP. One can conclude that if the
9In practice, thismin operation is rather implemented at the penultimate hop of the
LSP, the LH LSR, when PHP is the rule. However, for readability reason, we keep the
notation as simple as possible.
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LDP advertising policy traceroute
TTL propagation policy (assuming the same conﬁguration on both LERs)
ttl-propagate no-ttl-propagate
target < 255, 255 > < 255, 64 > 7
All internal preﬁxes
external
explicit LSP invisible LSP invisible LSP
no shift & no gap shift (FRPLA) & no gap shift (FRPLA) & gap (RTLA)
internal
explicit LSP Last Hop without label via BRPR Last Hop without label via BRPR
no shift & no gap shift (FRPLA) & no gap shift (FRPLA) & gap (RTLA)
Loopback address only
external
explicit LSP invisible LSP invisible LSP
no shift & no gap shift (FRPLA) & no gap shift (FRPLA) & gap (RTLA)
internal
explicit IP route route without labels via DPR route without labels via DPR
no shift & no gap shift (FRPLA) & no gap shift (FRPLA) & gap (RTLA)
Table 2: Visibility eﬀects of basic MPLS conﬁgurations according to the label advertisement policy (see Sec. 2.1 for details),
traceroute target (i.e., “external” refers to a traceroute target outside the AS having the invisible MPLS tunnel, while, with
“internal”, the traceroute destination is inside the AS), and TTL policy (i.e., does the ISP hides the tunnel using a no propaga-
tion feature or not?) and the signature of the LER. We assume PHP is applied.
Figure 3: Return Tunnel Length Analysis (RTLA). I and E are
respectively the Ingress and the Egress LERs of the return
LSP. h(X ,Y ) is the number of hops from node X to node Y.
forward and return paths are the same, the LSP is made of three
LSRs (a diﬀerence of 6−3 = 3 hops between the return and forward
path lengths).
FRPLA is our most generic method (see Table 2) as it should
work at least for all Cisco LSRs using PHP as default conﬁgura-
tion.10 On the contrary, RTLA only works for networks deploying
Juniper LERs on the edges. It produces similar results to FRPLA,
but with more accuracy (because Juniper TTL signatures provide
more information – see Table 1): while FRPLA only provides the
return path length until the vantage point and is, thus, sensitive
to route asymmetry (due to BGP in particular), RTLA provides ex-
actly the return tunnel length (at least in the absence of ECMP
routes that have distinct hop number) by exploiting the TTL gap
between two kinds of probes.7 Hence, when both RTLA and FRPLA
apply, we prefer to exploit the result given with RTLA.
With Juniper Egress LERs or other routers with signature <255,
64> (see Table 1), and when the min behavior is enabled on the
return LSP, two kinds of probes can be used for revealing the ac-
tual return path length with RTLA. Indeed, while the TTL of the
return path is initialized at 255 for ICMP time-exceeded replies, it
10Our survey highlights that 58% of operators deploy Cisco hardware.
is initialized at 64 for ICMP echo-reply [40]. In this latter case, the
IP-TTL of the answer is always lower than the LSE-TTL (because
this one is always set to 255 and tunnels are short enough). Conse-
quently, the last hop of the return tunnel, when applying themin
function, does not copy the LSE-TTL inside the IP-TTL packet, but
rather keeps the IP-TTL, which is is still at 64 for the reply that is
originated from the Egress LER of the forward path. That is what
we call a “gap” in Table 2. More formally, we can deduce the length
of the return tunnel, h(I ,E), as illustrated in Fig. 3. We observe that
the gap between the two return path lengths, given in the ﬁrst line,
is the number of hops of the return tunnel, h(I ,E).
For example, applying this computation to the example of Fig. 2
and assuming that the return path is the same as the forward path,
and that PE2 has a < 255, 64 > signature, we would have for the
time-exceeded packetTTLI P (VP) = 250, while for the echo-reply
packetTTLI P (VP) = 62. It comes (255−250)−(64−62) = 3, which
is the length of the (return) tunnel.
3.2 Revealing the Hidden Hops
The basic idea of these methods is that inside an MPLS net-
work, not all packets are forwarded through LSPs. This is because
LSPs may be constructed towards only a subset of internal pre-
ﬁxes (for example loopback addresses for Juniper routers, while
Cisco routers create LSPs for all internal preﬁxes) or only pack-
ets destined to a BGP next-hop may be switched through MPLS
(also a default behavior of Juniper routers [13, 27]). If one is able to
traceroute one of the router’s internal IGP IP addresses (belong-
ing to the preﬁxes related to internal traﬃc), e.g., the incoming in-
terface of the Egress LER (revealed with PHP), one can see explicit
IGP routes without labels, and so infers the hidden LDP tunnel.
Besides, Cisco routers can also be conﬁgured that way when
the network is partitioned into core and edge routers regarding
the IGP/BGP structuration (e.g., to avoid external routes redistri-
bution to IGP-only LSR). One can easily conﬁgure LDP preﬁxes
ﬁlters in order to limit LDP signalling for external BGP transit traf-
ﬁc. In both cases (Juniper per default or basic Cisco conﬁguration),
and when using the BGP next hop feature on LERs, all the exter-
nal BGP transit traﬃc goes through MPLS tunnels while the traﬃc
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targeting internal IP preﬁxes is routed via IGP explicit routes. On
Fig. 4c, we illustrate the use of the command mpls ldp label
allocate global host-routes that mimics a Juniper behavior
on Cisco routers: we reveal the explicit IGP route in a single prob-
ing shot if we target the incoming interface of the Egress PE2.left
(this interface shares a preﬁx with the last hop P3 on Fig. 4c). This
is the principle of the Direct Path Revelation (DPR).
Our last method, Backward Recursive Path Revelation (BRPR),
is based on the PHP feature when the network enables LDP ev-
erywhere (the standard and per default behavior of Cisco LSRs).
Since traceroute naturally reveals the incoming IP interface of
each Egress LER, we can apply a recursive traceroute approach
that targets this last internal preﬁx to reveal each intermediate hop
in a backward fashion from the Egress LER until the Ingress LER.
This approach works well when the BGP routes remain similar for
all internal preﬁxes of the targeted AS, i.e., they enter via the same
Ingress LER and follow the same shortest IGP path inside (this is
the default LDP behavior). It is worth mentioning that the incom-
ing IP interface of each Egress LSR appears thanks to both PHP and
the fact that the IP preﬁx belongs to the last hop and the Egress
LSR. On Fig. 4b, we show that four steps are necessary to stop the
recursion and reveal all internal LSRs in a backward fashion.
3.3 Validating our Measurement Techniques
In order to validate ourmeasurementmechanisms, we conducted
experimentations using GNS3. It allows us to run the actual Cisco
IOS system, in our case IOS 15.2(4), over an emulated platform. We
also analyzed a similar Juniper testbed, except for the UHP case
which is not available for LDP on Junos. We do not show the Ju-
niper emulation here due to space limitations. For our experimenta-
tions, we setup a simple conﬁguration (see Fig. 2) with three ASes:
AS1 is the client AS, with router CE1 (the traceroute source is
connected to CE1), a transit AS (AS2) runningMPLS and LDP as the
labeling protocol for the LSP setup between the ﬁve routers PE1,
P1, P2, P3, and PE2, and ﬁnally, another client AS, AS3, with router
CE2 connected to PE2. The initial traceroute target is an inter-
nal preﬁx of AS3 (i.e., a loopback of CE2). Routing between ASes
is handled with BGP, while internal routing is managed through
OSPF.
We tested several MPLS feature combinations on the network
given in Fig. 2. All of them are simple to enable (a few basic com-
mands per LSR) and close to the Cisco MPLS default conﬁguration.
The ﬁrst scenario is the so-called Default conﬁguration. PHP
(with implicit null label – label value of 3) and TTL propagation
are enabled by default, and all internal IP preﬁxes are announced
through LDP. In this case, traceroute explicitly shows LSPs, with
MPLS labels, as shown by the simulation output in Fig. 4a. Note
that the return TTL shown between brackets for nodes P1 and P2
are 247 and 248, because time-exceeded messages generated in-
side a tunnel are ﬁrst forwarded to the end of the tunnel [19].
The second scenario is theBackward Recursive conﬁguration.
It is the same as Default except that the TTL propagation is dis-
abled (command no mpls ip propagate-ttl applied on all LERs).
traceroute does not show MPLS tunnels anymore, as illustrated
in Fig. 4b. However, as mentioned in Sec. 3.2, retracing the previous
trace recursively backward starting initially from the Egress LER




BRPR or DPR 26%
Table 3: Cross-validation results on 5,364 Ingress-Egress
LERs pairs, scattered in 271 diﬀerent ASes.
PE2 until the Ingress LER PE1 allows us to reveal the entire tun-
nel, but without any MPLS ﬂag, one LSR at a time: tracing towards
PE2 reveals the incoming address of P3 (thanks to PHP), and trac-
ing towards P3 reveals the incoming address of P2, and so on. This
corresponds to the expected output with the Backward Recursive
Path Revelation technique (BRPR).
The third scenario is the Explicit Route conﬁguration. It is sim-
ilar to Backward Recursive, but only loopback addresses (i.e., “host
addresses” instead of all preﬁxes) are announced into LDP (com-
mand mpls ldp label allocate global host-routes applied
on all LERs). As said in the introduction of Sec. 3, this is also the
default Juniper conﬁguration. In this case, a trace towards CE2 re-
veals PE2 incoming address (which is not a loopback address, hence
it is not announced through LDP), and then a trace towards this ad-
dress reveals the full LSP PE1 → P1 → P2 → P3 → PE2 (Fig. 4c) but
without MPLS ﬂags since it is not switched through MPLS space.
It corresponds thus to the output expected with the Direct Path
Revelation (DPR).
Finally, the last scenario is the Totally Invisible conﬁguration.
In this case UHP is enabled on all LERs (the command mpls ldp
explicit-null triggers the use of explicit null labels). The (for-
ward) TTL propagation is also disabled. A trace towards CE2 does
not reveal PE2 (CE2 seems directly connected to PE1), as shown on
Fig. 4d. Assuming that an address of PE2 has been discovered by
another mean and can be used as a new target, none of the tech-
niques given in this paper reveal anything.
For FRPLA and RTLA, we analyzed the TTL of the ICMP time-
exceededmessages receivedwhen tracing. For example, while PE2
appears to be at six hops (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 4c) or three hops
(see Fig. 4d), the return TTL (provided between brackets on Fig. 4)
always indicates six hops (when tracing towards CE2), except in
the UHP case, providing so the shift and the gap that might be
exploited by FRPLA and RTLA.
To further validate our measurement techniques, we also per-
formed a cross-validation of hidden hops revelation techniques
(i.e., DPR and BRPR) on explicit tunnels. To do so, we collected
data from PlanetLab. We considered 23 PlanetLab vantage points
spread into ﬁve teams. Each team is responsible to probe towards
10,000 destinations (no overlapping between the teams) obtained
from the Archipelago dataset [15]. This leads to a total of 269,096
traces collected. We extracted 14,771 distinct Ingress-Egress LERs
pairs, with LSRs being explicitly revealed between the LERs. Note
that both LERs should be in the same AS and the content of the
LSR be fully revealed (i.e., no anonymous hops).
On those pairs, we rerun DPR and BRPR. On the one hand, DPR
is considered as successful if, when targeting the Egress LER, we
obtain the exact same number of hops between the Ingress and
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$p t CE2 . l e f t
1 CE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 5 ]
2 PE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 4 ]
3 P1 . l e f t [ 2 4 7 ]
MPLS Labe l 19 TTL=1
4 P2 . l e f t ! T2 [ 2 4 8 ]
MPLS Labe l 20 TTL=1
5 P3 . l e f t [ 2 5 1 ]
MPLS Labe l 21 TTL=1
6 PE2 . l e f t [ 2 5 0 ]
7 CE2 . l e f t [ 2 4 9 ]
(a) Default Conﬁguration:
explicit tunnel.
$p t CE2 . l e f t
1 CE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 5 ]
2 PE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 4 ]
3 PE2 . l e f t [ 2 5 0 ]
4 CE2 . l e f t [ 2 5 0 ]
$p t PE2 . l e f t
1 CE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 5 ]
2 PE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 4 ]
3 P3 . l e f t [ 2 5 1 ]
4 PE2 . l e f t [ 2 5 0 ]
$p t P3 . l e f t
1 CE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 5 ]
2 PE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 4 ]
3 P2 . l e f t [ 2 5 2 ]
4 P3 . l e f t [ 2 5 1 ]
$p t P2 . l e f t
1 CE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 5 ]
2 PE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 4 ]
3 P1 . l e f t [ 2 5 3 ]
4 P2 . l e f t [ 2 5 2 ]
$p t P1 . l e f t
1 CE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 5 ]
2 PE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 4 ]
3 P1 . l e f t [ 2 5 3 ]
(b) Last Hops without labels discovered
with a recursive process (BRPR).
$p t CE2 . l e f t
1 CE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 5 ]
2 PE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 4 ]
3 PE2 . l e f t [ 2 5 0 ]
4 CE2 . l e f t [ 2 5 0 ]
$p t PE2 . l e f t
1 CE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 5 ]
2 PE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 4 ]
3 P1 . l e f t [ 2 5 3 ]
4 P2 . l e f t [ 2 5 2 ]
5 P3 . l e f t [ 2 5 1 ]
6 PE2 . l e f t [ 2 5 0 ]
(c) Route without labels
in a single probe (DPR).
$p t CE2 . l e f t
1 CE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 5 ]
2 PE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 4 ]
3 CE2 . l e f t [ 2 5 2 ]
$p t PE2 . l e f t
1 CE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 5 ]
2 PE1 . l e f t [ 2 5 4 ]
3 PE2 . l e f t [ 2 5 3 ]
(d) Invisible UHP tunnel.
Figure 4: Emulation results for each basic conﬁguration (pt stands for the paris-traceroute command [5]). The TTL of each
ICMP time-exceeded reply received at the vantage point on the return path is provided between brackets for each hop. This is
the return IP-TTL used for FRPLA and RTLA analyses (the latter using two distinct return IP-TTL).
Egress LER11 and allMPLS labels have disappeared from the traceroute
output. On the other hand, BRPR is considered as successful if, at
each step of the recursion, the last hop does not exhibit any label.
On the 14,771 distinct Ingress-Egress LERs, we obtained 9,407
pairs for which the re-run failed, either because the Ingress or
the Egress was not re-discovered. Table 3 summarizes the cross-
validation on the 5,364 remaining pairs.
We see that in 8% of the cases, DPR or BRPR fail. However, in
60% of the cases, we have got a success with DPR and BRPR. Note
that, in a few particular cases (5%), tunnels were revealed partially
by DPR and partially by BRPR. Finally, in 26% of the cases, we suc-
cessfully retrieve the tunnel but we cannot discriminate between
DPR and BRPR as the LSP counts only one LSR.12
Finally, Table 3 shows a very low success rate for BRPR (3%).
This suggests that, given the large proportion of Cisco routers de-
ployed by operators, Cisco devices are conﬁgured to inject loop-
back addresses into LDP instead of all preﬁxes. This is particu-
larly true when the operator deploys hybrid hardware (Juniper
and Cisco – this hybrid situation is conﬁrmed by our survey, see
Sec. 2.3). In that case, Juniper devices systematically ﬁlters any
piece of information not associated to loopback addresses. Table
5 also experimentally conﬁrms this interesting result.
3.4 Discussion
Our techniques cover all basic MPLS conﬁgurations, except the
totally invisible one with UHP enabled (not the standard conﬁgura-
tion as it is useless for basic LDP tunneling – our survey highlights
the fact that only 10% of the operators deploy UHP). The main con-
ﬁguration of Cisco (PHP and all preﬁxes enabled) is seen with FR-
PLA and BRPR. The basic Juniper conﬁguration is seen with DPR
and also causes a shift visible with FRPLA. The mix with Juniper
LER and Cisco LSR is speciﬁcally covered with RTLA. It is likely
that all other mixes with PHP as the default mode also triggers
11In practice, most of the time, both paths (i.e., the explicit tunnel and the one revealed
by DPR), are exactly the same. However, in some cases, load balancing with ECMP
may exhibit a similar path but with distinct IP addresses.
12This last statement is aligned with the very short tunnel length distribution [19, 36].
one signal, i.e., with Cisco LER, at least FRPLA should work (and
so BRPR) and with Juniper LER, RTLA and DPR (and/or BRPR)
should work. BRPR and DPR can be combined in several ways for
tracking more advanced conﬁgurations with LDP ﬁlters or hetero-
geneous OS, as when some internal preﬁxes are not announced in
LDP.
On the contrary to other techniques, FRPLA should not be used
in the wild at the tunnel scale, otherwise it faces the risk of produc-
ing false positives (i.e., a tunnel length ofX hops is inferred because
the return path hasX more hops than the forward one due to rout-
ing asymmetry) and false negatives (i.e., the return pat is shorter of
X hops compared to the forward one due to routing asymmetry).
Instead, FRPLA should be used, using multiple independent van-
tage points, as a statistical method in order to correctly infer the
existence, and possibly the average length, of invisible tunnels at
the AS scale. Indeed, if the traceroute campaign produces traces
entering through a suﬃcient number of Ingress LER in the target
AS, it is very likely the routing asymmetry will follow a normal
law centered on 0 (as already conﬁrmed by our experimental re-
sults, see Fig. 7 in particular). In other words, FRPLA actually mea-
sures the sum of the length of the return tunnel and the IP routing
asymmetry of the trace. This asymmetry being the length diﬀer-
ence between forward and return paths (a positive or a negative
shift).
Generally speaking, if MPLS is enabled in a given network with
PHP (it is by default for basic LDP tunneling, whatever the conﬁg-
urations and the OSes), we should see it with at least one of our
techniques. On the contrary, UHP, mainly designed for traﬃc en-
gineering oriented tunnels, turns RSVP-TE tunnels really invisible.
Since network operators have no reasons to deploy RSVP-TE with-
out also enabling LDP, we argue our set of techniques provides at
least one MPLS signal in the vast majority of cases, provided some
transit traces traversing LDP signaled LSPs.
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4 DATA COLLECTION
Prior to deploying in the wild our measurement techniques, we
looked for HDNs in theCaida ITDK dataset [10] (it provides router
level topologies). We ﬁrst cleaned up the dataset by removing non
publicly-routable IP addresses and pseudo-addresses allocated to
non-responsive routers. After this pruning, 45,021,817 IP addresses,
44,700,863 nodes, 2,705,780 links, and 43,178 ASes remained.
We set the threshold for diﬀerentiating low degree nodes from
high degree nodes (HDNs) to 128 (i.e., any node with a degree
greater or equal to 128 is tagged as an HDN) and select areas of
interest on where to send our probes. The 128 degree HDN thresh-
old is selected to be a lower bound relative to well-known physical
hardware, in particular PE routers which we expect to terminate
invisible tunnels. For instance, the ASR9000 series is one of the best
selling Cisco PE routers. This router can be equipped with up to
20 linecards, each containing up to 16 interfaces. Thus, a thresh-
old of 128 is a reasonable balance between the volume of probes
sent (we do not want to burden the network) and the amount of
interesting data collected. Obviously, invisible tunnels do not only
occur between HDNs, but we expect that many HDN pairs hide
invisible tunnels (proportionally much more than non HDN pairs).
Considering a threshold of 128 let us with 17,944 HDNs.
To eﬃciently guide our measurements, we retrieved, from the
Caida ITDK dataset [10], the neighbors of theHDNs (setA– 599,467
unique nodes) and, next, the neighbors of neighbors of HDNs (set
B – 983,793 unique nodes). This latter set is able to provide us IP
addresses that do not belong to the same AS as addresses in the
former set (our basic hypothesis is that MPLS LERs also deﬁne
borders of domains13). Our aim is to simulate transit traﬃc, i.e.,
entirely traversing the suspicious AS made of many HDNs and
ending up to one of its neighbors. Since we are looking for targets
around HDNs in general, the destination set of our measurement
campaign is the union of both sets (setA
⋃
B). We obtained a total
of 1,306,545 destination IP addresses.
Our measurement scripts used scamper [29], and its Paris trace-
route [5] implementation with ICMP echo-request packets, start-
ing at TTL equals 2. In addition, echo-request probes are also sent
to all IP addresses appearing in the traces for router signature in-
ference [40]. For each of these traces, we look at the last three hops,
say X, Y, D (where D ∈ A
⋃
B). X and Y are candidate endpoints of an
invisible tunnel. A second trace with Y as target is then launched.
If this trace ends with X, H, Y, we infer that one hop, H, has been
revealed from an invisible tunnel. A new trace is then launched to-
wards H (recursive processing with BRPR) as an attempt to reveal
more hops. If a new hop, say H’, is discovered in the trace towards
H (this trace should end with X, H’, H), the recursion continues with
H’ as the target and so on. This recursive process stops either if no
new address is revealed (so we cannot distinguish DPR from BRPR
if the recursion stops at the second trace – the revealed tunnel has
only one hop), or if the new trace does not go through X . Note
that multiple IP addresses may have been revealed in a single shot,
i.e., the trace towards Y ends with X, H1, H2, . . . , Hn−1, Hn , Y, with
n > 1 being the number of hops discovered with DPR.
13This has been veriﬁed with the bdrmap [30] dataset, but partially (as both measure-
ment campaigns are strongly diﬀerent, intersection between datasets is sometimes
weak).
Since we are looking for invisible MPLS tunnels spanning a sin-
gle AS, and with HDNs as a trigger, our post-processing methods
select only traces ending by I, E, D where I and E are HDNs lo-
cated in the sameAS. For AS resolution, we referred toCaida node-
to-AS mapping when available, otherwise IP-to-AS mapping from
Team Cymru.14 Our ﬁndings for these I, E couples are discussed
in the next section.
Our tool was deployed on the PlanetLab testbed on 91 Vantage
Points (VP) distributed all around the world (USA, Canada, Eu-
rope, Japan, Russia, Brazil, China, Australia, New Zealand). The
VPs were distributed equally in ﬁve groups, paying attention to the
geographical locations. The destination set (A
⋃
B) was distributed
amongst the diﬀerent groups of VPs as follows: (i) the HDN neigh-
bors (set A) were randomly spread over ﬁve subsets, (ii) the neigh-
bors of each neighbors (set B) were added in the corresponding
VPs subsets. It is worth noticing that the diﬀerent destinations sub-
sets were thus consistent, i.e., if neighbor N is in VP set 1, then all
neighbors of N are also in VP set 1. The sizes of the destination
subsets are similar amongst the VP sets: 579,012 (VP set 1), 583,173
(VP set 2), 586,363 (VP set 3), 588,771 (VP set 4), and 586,229 (VP
set 5). All measurements on each VP set were launched simultane-
ously on November 18th, 2016 with scamper probing at a rate of
25 packets/second. The fastest VP set ﬁnished the measurements
on November 29th, 2016, while the slowest ﬁnished on December
6th, 2016.
5 MEASUREMENT RESULTS
This section provides three kinds of analysis to demonstrate the
eﬃciency of our contributions. First, we start by studying and com-
paring the eﬃciency of our two most powerful techniques, DPR
and BRPR, for revealing IP internal hops (Sec. 5.1). Second, we ana-
lyze the Return & Forward Asymmetry (i.e., the diﬀerence between
the return and forward path in term of number of hops), with FR-
PLA in particular, and we cross-validate it when it intersects with
DPR and BRPR (Sec. 5.2). Finally, we study the distribution of re-
turn tunnel length with RTLA, its incidence on path asymmetry,
and, again, we cross-validate it using DPR and BRPR with a return
and forward path asymmetry perspective (Sec. 5.3). We demon-
strate thus that most of the invisible tunnels can be identiﬁed in
some way, either explicitly (DPR or BRPR) or implicitly (FRPLA or
RTLA)
Table 4 provides many pieces of information for ASes present-
ing the largest number of HDNs for which we were able to reveal
the content of invisible tunnels (with the exception of AS2856). The
two columns labeled “HDNs” refer to the number ofHDNs found in
theCaida dataset (“ITDK”) but also to those (“Candidate”), encoun-
tered in our measurement campaign, that can potentially act as
Ingress or Egress LER. The “I – E pairs” columns refer to IP address
pairs, belonging to candidate HDNs, that potentially act as Ingress
or Egress LER (“Candidate”). The next column, “%Rev.”, provides
the proportion of Ingress – Egress pairs for which we were able to
reveal the content of hidden tunnels. The next three columns pro-
vide raw statistics about revealed MPLS LSPs for those candidates.
The column labeled “Raw LSPs” gives the number of unique LSP
(as a sequence of IP addresses) we identiﬁed, while column “#IPs
14See http://www.team-cymru.org/IP-ASN-mapping.html
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ISP (ASN)
HDNs I – E Pairs (IP) Revealed LSPs Graph Density
ITDK Candidate Candidate %Rev. Raw LSPs #IPs LSRs %IPs LERs Before After
Telia (1299) 1,819 1,317 58,548 0.2 102 59 42.4 0.024 0.019
China Telecom (4134) 1,212 1,078 31,728 2.8 1,016 281 61.6 0.008 0.007
Tinet Spa (3257) 1,032 654 12,411 55.1 12,577 1,092 44.2 0.033 0.009
Level 3 (3549) 708 425 9,028 65.6 8,675 757 32.6 0.065 0.007
Deutsche Telekom (3320) 497 364 21,189 68.2 29,395 1,385 40.0 0.108 0.013
Telecom Italia (6762) 346 129 6,235 73.6 7,548 214 83.6 0.236 0.094
Qwest (209) 271 110 1609 28 552 65 0 0.151 0.056
Bharti Airtel (9498) 159 150 11,909 12.5 4,199 493 44.8 0.138 0.041
PCCW Global (3491) 92 57 3,512 52.6 3,704 264 5.3 0.300 0.045
British Telecom (2856) 1,944 148 5656 0.1 3 0 0 0.2 0.2
Table 4: InvisibleMPLS tunnels discovery for ASes of interest (I – E stands for Ingress – Egress). Most ASes are Tier-1 or Transit
(Tier-2, etc.) ISPs having large inter-connections, possibly resulting in dense HDN graphs.












































Figure 6: RTT correction
with hop revelation (AS3549).
LSRs” gives the number of unique IP addresses revealed. The last
column is the proportion of those revealed IP addresses also identi-
ﬁed as Ingress or Egress LER. Finally, the column “Graph Density”
indicates how the density15 of those ISP graphs is corrected when
revealing invisible MPLS tunnels. It is worth noticing that the den-
sity is, here, computed only based on Ingress – Egress pairs (and
not on the whole ISP graph).
5.1 Path Revelation with DPR and BRPR
In ourmeasurement campaign, a total of 13,771 invisible tunnels
were revealed. Among this number, 8,477 were elicited by DPR,
2,270 by BRPR and, ﬁnally, 3,024 were too short (i.e., LSP made of
a single hop) to determine which measurement technique applies.
The additional probing induced by BRPR (i.e., the recursion to re-
veal the tunnel content) was 8,180 probes.
Fig. 5 illustrates the revealed tunnels length as the number of
hops (X-axis) required to reach the tunnel exit point (i.e., Egress
LER). A value of 2 means thus a tunnel made of a single LSR. Note
that a tunnel of length 1 cannot hide an LSR. The Y-axis provides
the raw number of IP addresses acting as Egress LER. The red dot
refers to very short tunnels, i.e., a single LSR. In that case, DPR and
BRPR are indistinguishable. The distribution does not really look
like a power-lawwith a strong shape and heavy tail. But still, this is
15The density of a graph with E edges and V vertices is 2×E
V×(V−1)
.















(a) Non HDN and Ingress LER
vs. Egress LER.















(b) Corrected distribution of FR-
PLA with Path Revelation.
Figure 7: Return vs. Forward path Asymmetry (RFA).
a strongly decreasing function bounded with relatively short tun-
nels, i.e, very few of them exceed 12 hops. This tunnel length distri-
bution is aligned with previous results on visible tunnels [19, 36].
We can also observe on Fig. 5 that the distributions for DPR and
BRPR behave diﬀerently. This is because DPR discovers the whole
tunnel with only one additional trace while BRPR needs one trace
for each IP address. A signiﬁcant share of its attempts may fail be-
fore discovering the whole tunnel, resulting in shorter average tun-
nels. Table 4 shows the number of newly discovered IP addresses
for revealed LSPs (column “#IPs LSRs”).
Fig. 6 shows the RTT evolution for each hop of a trace traversing
an invisible tunnel in AS3549. When the tunnel is invisible (blue
dashed line), we observe a jump of about 50 ms in the RTT values
between hops 8 (Ingress LER) and 9 (Egress LER). However, once
the tunnel has been revealed (black curve), this large delay is actu-
ally decomposed between the seven hops of the tunnel.
5.2 Return vs. Forward Asymmetry
Fig. 7 provides the Return & Forward Asymmetry (RFA) distri-
bution. This distribution is based on FRPLA, i.e., it reveals the ac-
tual return path length (in terms of IP hops) while the forward
path length is underestimated due to the invisibility of the forward
tunnel. With RFA, a value of 0 in the distribution is inconclusive
for us as it means that return and forward paths have the same
length. Similarly, a negative value in the distribution (the return
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path is shorter than the forward one) does not bring any informa-
tion about a potential invisible tunnel. Finally, a positive value is
the ideal case for us, as the return path is longer than the forward
one. We can therefore assume the presence of an invisible tunnel.
Fig. 7a provides the RFA distribution in several cases. First, we
have a look at paths not involved in MPLS tunnels or HDNs, i.e.,
the red curve (“Others” means any IP address except those tagged
as HDN) and the black curve (IP address identiﬁed as HDN Ingress
LER). In both cases, the path asymmetry follows a normal law cen-
tered in 0, with a median value of 1, the symmetry being not per-
fect. In general, paths between two nodes in the Internet are not
the same in both directions. It is due to, among others, BGP hot-
potato routing. However, on average over a large number of pairs,
the distribution should be (almost) symmetrical.
However, the story is diﬀerent when HDNs are classiﬁed as
Egress LER in our campaign (blue curve on Fig. 7a: they are Egress
LERs for which we revealed nodes on the forward path – “PR”
means “Path Revelation”): the normal law is now signiﬁcantly shifted
towards positive values (median of 4) and a bit ﬂattened out as
three values show almost the same level of density (diﬀerence of
0, 1, and 2 hops). We also considered all Egress LERs, even those
where we do not ﬁnd any forward paths with a Path Revelation
technique (red curve on Fig. 7b – NPR means “No Path Revela-
tion”). Since it underestimates the diﬀerence when comparing it to
Egress LERs for which we reveal a forward path (Egress PR), we
can conclude that FRPLA and RTLA are not really eﬃcient when
path revelation does not work either. Generally speaking, the dif-
ference observed between the Egress curve and the other curves is
due to the return tunnel path length, following a kind of power-law,
that is taken into account with FRPLA. This signiﬁcant shifting of
the median is a direct consequence of the forward tunnel invisibil-
ity. Indeed, the forward path length does not include the hidden
hops, while the complete return path length is obtained based on
the TTL in the ICMP replies sent by the Egress LER.
Fig. 7b tries to ﬁx this shift by using the actual lengths of for-
ward paths revealed by DPR or BRPR. This cross validation is per-
formed on the intersection of the path revelation methods and FR-
PLA. For each revealed tunnel towards an Egress LER, we add the
number of revealed hops (either with DPR or BRPR) to the for-
ward path length, and then, we re-analyze the Return and For-
ward Asymmetry (RFA). We notice that it works very well for most
networks. In particular, for all Egress LERs considered in Fig. 7b,
we see that the corrected Egress curve (black curve on Fig. 7b)
is almost centered at 0 compared to the curves for the non cor-
rected distribution. Again, we observe that the shift in asymmetry
is much more remarkable when looking only at forward tunnels
revealed with path revelation mechanisms: it means that FRPLA
is much more coherent for Egress for which we revealed a tunnel
than for those we were unable. These results are aligned with our
discussion about the standard conﬁgurations when we state that
both techniques apply (revelation and length analysis) to the same
conﬁgurations (see Sec. 3.4).
5.3 Return Tunnel Length
It is worth reminding that RTLA is more accurate than FRPLA,
but speciﬁc to LERs with < 255, 64 > signature (instead of all LERs














Figure 8: RFA time-exceeded and echo-replymessages.
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Figure 9: RTLA with Juniper Egress LER (at the IP level).
for FRPLA). This higher accuracy comes from the fact that it pro-
vides exactly the return tunnel length instead of the total return
path length (as with FRPLA). This analysis, based on RTLA results,
works thanks to our particular campaign design: we speciﬁcally
target HDNEgress LERs (and their neighbors, again Ingress/Egress
LERs or borders of other domains) that are likely to be themselves
entry points for tunnels being the ﬁrst segment of the return path.
When building ICMP messages, the Egress LER sets the IP-TTL to
its maximum value (255 – time-exceeded– or 64 – echo-reply–
for Juniper, always 255 for Cisco). If 255 is used, the LSE-TTL will
be lower or equal to the IP-TTL when exiting the return tunnel on
the return path. Themin behavior will then replace the IP-TTL by
the lower LSE-TTL value. However, when using 64 as initial TTL,
as it is the case for echo-reply on Juniper routers, the LSE-TTL
will always be greater that the IP-TTL, and themin behavior will
let the IP-TTL unchanged. Hence the gap between the path lengths
obtained with time-exceeded and echo-reply messages directly
provides the return tunnel length.
Fig. 8 shows the gap between the lengths of return/forward paths
(RFA) considering both IP-TTLs of Juniper LERs. If we compare
the two curves, we observe a shift towards the positive values
for the time-exceededmessages. Indeed, the asymmetry of paths
does not follow a normal law centered in 0 for this type of mes-
sage (blue curve), as the median equals 4. However, if we consider
echo-replymessages (black curve), the distribution is almost cen-
tered in 0 (the highest peak is at 0 while the median is 2). The
reason is that with an IP-TTL value of 64, the return path does
not exhibit a really signiﬁcant signal of any return tunnel. The
asymmetrical shape of the black curve may be due to some TTL
operation variation at one hop (the last hop of the return tunnel in
particular).
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Fig. 9a shows the tunnel length distribution for the return LSP as
revealed with RTLA. We can compare it to the one of forward LSP
given in Fig. 5. Both distributions look very similar. On Fig. 9a, the
low amount of negative values (the shaded area) probably comes
from ECMP variations, or other speciﬁc return path noise for some
of our Vantage Points. On Fig. 9b, we try to assess the accuracy of
RTLA. In the fashion of what we have done for Fig. 7b, we subtract
the return tunnel length (as depicted in the scheme given in Fig. 3)
with the actual forward tunnel length (FTL) obtained either with
DPR or BRPR. It seems to work well at this global scale: the distri-
bution almost follows a normal law centered in 0 as expected.
6 MPLS ANALYSIS
One lesson of ourmeasurements is thatMPLS deployment, hence
its behavior, is greatly variable from one ISP to another, as can be
seen from Table 5. In this table, we detail MPLS deployment charac-
teristics for the same networks given in Table 4. First, we sort them
considering their signatures (see Table 1): ﬁrst ranked ASes belong
mostly to Cisco while last ranked ones mainly include Juniper de-
vices. Second, we provide the scores of our two active revelation
techniques (their relative eﬃciency) and their possible combina-
tion (“Others”). Finally, we show how FRPLA and RTLA perform
compared to them for estimating the average tunnel length (“FTL”
gives the Forward Tunnel Length in term of number of hops, as
revealed with our path revelation technique).
In Table 5, when looking at hardware deployed (TTL signature
columns) and hidden hop discovery techniques, we observe two
tendencies. First, we have several ASes that show a consistent be-
havior. For instance, AS3257 (and, to a lower extent, AS9498) is
built around Juniper hardware. As expected, the vast majority of
hidden IP interfaces is revealed with DPR. On the contrary, while
AS3491 deploys mostly Cisco hardware, BRPR succeeds in general
to reveal hidden hops. Second, other ASes appear to deploy a mix
of router vendors and, and thus, as mentioned in Sec. 3.3, DPR pro-
vides better results. It is worth noticing that AS3549 is the only one
with a high prevalence of the TTL signature <64,64>, and the most
eﬃcient discovery method is DPR. So, the behavior associated to
this signature looks similar to the Juniper routers behavior. An-
other ﬁnding for AS3549 (not shown on the Table) is that Juniper
seems prevalent at the edge (Ingress and Egress) while the <64,64>
signature is prevalent in the core (revealed IP addresses).
The last group of columns in the table looks at the return tunnel
length estimation (with FRPLA) and inference (RTLA), and com-
pares them to the forward tunnel length revealed by path revela-
tion techniques. AS2856 is not signiﬁcant in this case since almost
no tunnels were revealed (as stated in Table 4). We see that, for FR-
PLA, the median is not far from the actual median tunnel length,
considering that this method is sensitive to asymmetric routing.
RTLA, when feasible (i.e., Juniper Egress routers), provides a value
consistent with the tunnel length (see “FTL” in Table 5). This indi-
cates that the TTL behavior at the Egress router on the return tun-
nel is often themin one. This was expected for AS6762 or AS3320
as they mix Cisco and Juniper routers. This is more surprising
for AS3257 as it seems fully Juniper. This probably suggests that
AS3257 deploys unusual MPLS conﬁguration. Finally, as AS1299




























Figure 10: Eﬀects of invisible MPLS tunnels on degree distri-
bution. Peak values disappear.
seems to mainly contain really short tunnels (77% of revealed tun-
nels are classiﬁed as “DPR or BRPR”, meaning that only one LSR is
retrieved). It explains, at least partially, why FRPLA and RTLA do
not provide signiﬁcant information for it.
7 INTERNET MODEL UPDATE
One of the key metrics in Internet modeling comes from the
seminal paper by Faloutsos et al. [21]: the node degree distribu-
tion. This metric gives the proportion of nodes with k adjacencies
(for all integer k , see Fig. 1). This distribution may be an indica-
tor of the network resilience to failures and attacks [25]. Faloutsos
et al. found that the node degree distribution follows a power-law
shape. If this has been heavily questioned in the past [16, 28, 31],
we advocate in this paper that invisible MPLS tunnels might artiﬁ-
cially increase node degrees, since each Ingress LER appears as the
neighbor of all exit points in a given AS. This assumption has been,
in this paper, the starting point of measurement techniques for re-
vealing hidden tunnels. Fig. 10 shows the eﬀects of hidden tunnels
on the degree distribution, and how this distribution is corrected
once the tunnels content is taken into account.
We achieve this as follows: we mapped each Ingress - Egress
pair to a router identiﬁer using the Caida ITDK dataset [10]. The
obtained graph is used to compute the degree distribution in the
invisible case (blue dashed line on Fig. 10). Then, we also mapped
all the IP addresses revealed by our techniques in MPLS tunnels.
The updated graph is used to compute the degree distribution in
the visible case (black line on Fig. 10). If we were unable to perform
the mapping with the Caida dataset, we assigned a new identiﬁer
to the IP address. However, note that we were able to map 97% of
the revealed IP addresses in the Caida dataset. After the mapping,
we counted the number of neighbors for the obtained routers.16
On Fig. 10, the Y-axis provides the PDF, while the X-axis gives the
number of neighbors.
Fig. 10a illustrates the degree distribution for all ASes. Twomain
results arise: as expected, (i), when tunnels are hidden (blue dashed
line), the proportion of HDNs is larger than when the revealed con-
tent is taken into account and, (ii), two peaks are observed (for a
number of neighbors of 17 and 23). Those two peaks are due to
16Note that, for the comparison, we consider the intersection between our dataset and
the ITDK one. It justiﬁes that the degrees observed in Fig. 10 are much lower than the
ones in Fig. 1 as our dataset is limited to a relatively small sample.
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ASN
TTL signature (%) Hidden Hop Discovery (%) #Hidden Hops (median)
<255,255> <255,64> <64,64> DPR BRPR DPR or BRPR Others FRPLA RTLA FTL
3491 93 0 0 2 74 20 4 4 - 2
4134 73 0 0 13 3 83 1 1 - 1
2856 67 30 1 33 0 67 0 -3 - 1
3320 53 41 0 50 9 2 40 4 2 2
6762 37 53 0 6 69 17 7 4 3 2
209 27 37 0 98 0 2 0 3 2 4
1299 25 74 0 19 3 77 0 0 0 1
3549 11 45 38 73 3 1 24 5 4 5
9498 7 72 0 99 0 1 0 4 4 4
3257 0 96 0 99 0 1 0 4 2 4
Table 5: MPLS deployment per AS. The percentage for TTL signatures is rounded (the total may exceed 100%). “DPR or BRPR”
refers to hops revealed by either DPR or BRPR (when only one IP address is discovered in a tunnel, there is no diﬀerence
between the two methods). “Others” refers to a mix of discovery techniques (a tunnel might be, in some case, revealed by DPR
and, in another trace, by BRPR).













Figure 11: Eﬀects of invisible MPLS tunnels on path length
distribution for all ASes.
two ASes in particular: the peak at 23 is caused by invisible tun-
nels in AS3320 (Deutsche Telekom – see Fig. 10b), while the other
one is due to AS3549 (Level3 – not shown here due to space limi-
tations). Focusing on a given AS (as in Fig. 10b) provides very in-
sightful results: for AS3320, we identify a kind of full-mesh made
of 23 routers (a representative sample of the real network) that
we are able to turn into a more general graph where the shape of
the degree distribution becomes standard. This is conﬁrmed by the
graph density analysis for AS3320, as provided by Table 4. Indeed,
its density is divided by a factor of ten once invisible tunnels are
revealed.
The path length (i.e., the number of hops between two devices
in the network) is an important metric for modeling the Internet
topology as it takes part into the shortest path (i.e., the path of-
fering the minimum distance between a given pair of nodes), the
average path length (i.e., the average length of shortest paths for all
pairs of networking devices), or the graph diameter (i.e., the longest
shortest path) [33]. Obviously, if many nodes are hidden by long
invisible MPLS tunnels, the path length distribution will be biased
and the resulting inferred model (such as small world) biased.
Fig. 11 shows the eﬀects of invisibleMPLS tunnels on path length
distribution (blue dashed line) and the shift when hidden routers
are revealed by our methods (black plain line). This has been com-
puted on the data we collected (see Sec. 4). If both distributions
(invisible and visible) more or less display the familiar bell-shaped
curve typical of Internet distance distributions, it is clear that, by re-
vealing hidden hops, we can observe a shift towards longer routes.
In particular, the mean is at 10 with invisible tunnels, while it is
at 12 when one lifts the curtain on MPLS tunnels. In addition, it
is worth noticing that it is still an underestimation because, when
a trace goes through several invisible tunnels, our current set of
techniques only reveal the last one. Thus, as a signiﬁcant share
of routing traces is likely to traverse up to two invisible MPLS net-
works, onemay conclude that the actual length shift may be higher.
Finally, as most of our targets are Egress LERs belonging to Tier-
1 networks, one may multiply by almost a factor two our results
about path length to infer the typical length of routes in the Inter-
net (we did not take into account the descending route from the
Tier-1 to another Stub network).
Obviously the results presented in this section are only illustra-
tions of the eﬀect of invisible tunnels on basic graph characteristics
as seen with our dataset. Much more extensive measurement cam-
paigns and analyses are required as far as the whole Internet is
concerned.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented and evaluated several kinds of tech-
niques for revealing IP level information hidden by invisible MPLS
tunnels. Our set of active and analytical mechanisms allowed us to
provide insights about standard MPLS practices of ISPs. Besides,
we revisited some basic Internet graph characteristics that are bi-
ased by invisible MPLS tunnels.
We validated our set of active techniques through emulation,
cross-validation and a survey of operators and, then, implemented
them on PlanetLab. We also propose and validate two analytical
techniques. To summarize, we distinguished between a set of tech-
niques (FRPLA and RTLA) able to provide the length distribution
of invisible tunnels, and others (DPR and BRPR) that indeed re-
veal the IP hops hidden by invisible tunnels. In particular, FRPLA
has the advantage of being scalable (as it is a pure analytical tech-
nique) and to work with any IP level dataset, as it only relies on
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Brand
MPLS Trigger Revelation
LDP Popping FRPLA RTLA DPR BRPR
Cisco all preﬁxes PHP  – – 
Juniper loopback PHP ()   ()
Table 6: Measurement techniques applicability.
standard traceroute campaigns. RTLA is based on a similar analy-
sis as FRPLA that studies the return path of replies, but it requires
an additional echo-request per IP address. In practice, for tun-
nels endpoints being Juniper routers, it provides a more accurate
estimation of the invisible tunnels length than FRPLA. Those two
techniques are enough to determine whether an AS hides an invis-
ible MPLS cloud. They are also suﬃcient to evaluate the stretch in
terms of Internet path length caused by invisible MPLS tunnels.
The DPR and BRPR techniques imply a more speciﬁc and com-
plexmeasurement campaign since route tracing is aimed at dynam-
ically revealing IP addresses originally hidden by MPLS tunnels.
This additional IP level information allows us to gain knowledge
on the internal architecture of opaque MPLS ASes. More generally
the Internet graph and its node degree distribution in particular
can be corrected. Finally, we identiﬁed a few ASes where our tech-
niques did not succeed, while they claim to deploy MPLS features
(according to their websites). This is probably because they use
MPLS only with UHP, for VPN and/or traﬃc engineering, leaving
tunnels truly invisible for the time being.
In this work, the measurement campaign has been driven by
the presence of abnormal high degree nodes in the router level
topology. Those nodes were a trigger for performing dedicated in-
visible MPLS tunnel discovery. However, in this paper, we have
shown that FRPLA and RTLA techniques are able to infer the pres-
ence of invisible tunnels. We could then envision a modiﬁcation
of traceroute, using FRPLA and RTLA as triggers for the pres-
ence of invisible tunnels, and BRPR and DPR to reveal the internal
nodes on the ﬂy, as suggested by Table 6.
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